How did the study of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics by Latin academics in the thirteenth century influence Christian moral discourse and in particular its discourse about virtue? This is a large and difficult question, to be sure, and one of obvious interest to any genealogist of Western moral consciousness. In order to answer it, we must first understand how thirteenth-century Latin academics understood Aristotle's text and, more narrowly, the relation of its doctrines to Christian ones. Evidence pertinent to those questions can of course be found in many sources.
1 This article collects and assesses evidence from one early and largely unknown source: the lectio cum questionibus on chapters 4-10 of the Ethica nova preserved in MS Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, VIII G 8, ff. 4 ra -9
vb .
2
The "Naples Commentary" appears to derive from lectures delivered by a master in the Faculty of Arts at Paris at sometime between 1225 and 1240.
3 It is one of the six extant Latin commentaries which examine all or part of the first three books of the Ethics, and are martin j. tracey based on a translation that antedates Robert Grosseteste's translation of 1247/48.
4
Relatively little has been written about the work, which was lost to medievalists until 1937.
5 To date only two scholars have discussed its contents in detail. They have done so, moreover, on the basis of a small number of loci and in respect of two main subjects: our Commentator's understanding of felicitas and scientia moralis.
6 Until very recently, those who would read the Naples Commentary were obliged to do so in manuscript; a critical edition was not published until 2006.
7
The subject of virtus is not an easy one to trace in the Naples Commentary, because, unlike other pre-1250 commentaries, it does not include any discussion of Aristotle's "treatise on virtue" in books 2 and 3 of the Ethics. More challenging still, our Commentator never mentions by name any particular virtue, such as fortitudo or temperantia. He consistently uses the word virtus in the sense of the power of soul; in his text, it is most commonly a synonym for potentia. It rarely denotes "moral excellence" in general or any particular moral excellence. If one were to make a list of human virtutes based on the Naples Commentator's characteristic use of the word, bravery and temperance would not be on it but reason and imagination would.
Aristotle's teaching on virtue was not as difficult for thirteenth-century Latin academics to assimilate as were some other parts of his moral
